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Abstract. We propose a simple agent-based model of the political elec-
tion prediction market which reﬂects the intrinsic feature of the predic-
tion market as an information aggregation mechanism. Each agent has
a vote, and all agents’ votes determine the election result. Some of the
agents participate in the prediction market. Agents form their beliefs
by observing their neighbors’ voting disposition, and trade with these
beliefs by following some forms of the zero-intelligence strategy. In this
model, the mean price of the market is used as a forecast of the election
result. We study the eﬀect of the radius of agents’ neighborhood and
the geographical distribution of information on the prediction accuracy.
In addition, we also identify one of the mechanisms which can replicate
the favorite-longshot bias, a stylized fact in the prediction market. This
model can then provide a framework for further analysis on the predic-
tion market when market participants have more sophisticated trading
behavior.
Keywords: Prediction market, Agent-based simulation, Information ag-
gregation mechanism, Prediction accuracy, Zero-intelligence agents, Favorite-
longshot bias
1 Introduction
Prediction Markets, sometimes referred to as “information markets,” “idea fu-
tures” or “event futures”, are markets where participants trade contracts whose
payoﬀs are tied to a future event, thereby yielding prices that can be interpreted
as market-aggregated forecasts [1]. To predict whether a particular event (say,
some candidate winning the election) will happen, a common approach is to cre-
ate a security that will pay out some predetermined amount (say, 1 dollar) if the
event happens, and let agents trade this security until a stable price emerges;
the price can then be interpreted as the consensus probability that the event
will happen. There is mounting evidence that such markets can help to pro-
duce forecasts of event outcomes with a lower prediction error than conventional
forecasting methods [2].
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To explain the eﬃciency of the prediction market in relation to aggregate in-
formation, many researchers use the eﬃcient market hypothesis which attributes
the market eﬃciency to a pool of knowledgeable traders who are capable of set-
ting prices and acting without bias [3]. While Manski proposed a model [4] to
ﬁnd that price is a particular quantile of the distribution of traders’ beliefs, price
does not reveal the mean belief that traders hold, but does yield a bound on the
mean belief. It can explain both the market eﬃciency and another stylized fact
in prediction markets - favorite-longshot bias - which means that likely events
(favorite) are underpriced or underestimated and unlikely events (longshot) are
overpriced or overestimated [5]. Wolfers and Zitzewitz provided suﬃcient condi-
tions under which prediction market prices coincide with average beliefs among
traders in a model with log-utility agents [6]. Snowberg and Wolfers found ev-
idence that misperceptions of probability drive the favorite-long shot bias, as
suggested by prospect theory [7].
In this paper, we follow the recent research trend in agent-based prediction
markets, and construct a spatial agent-based political futures markets based on
the two-dimensional cellular automata. We begin this study with the device of
zero-intelligence agents which was introduced into agent-based economic model-
ing by Gode and Sunder [8] and later on was applied to prediction markets by
Othman [9]. However, instead of studying the general-purpose prediction mar-
kets, we focus on the political futures market, which, needless to say, is one of
the most active application areas of prediction markets. This focus motivates us
a spatial extension of the Othman’s model. This extension also enables us to
address a number of issues which cannot not be easily approached by either the
neoclassical models of prediction markets [4,7] or by agent-based prediction mar-
kets without spatial conﬁgurations. Speciﬁcally, the question is how exactly the
information dissemination aﬀect the information aggregation given that agents
can only form their beliefs based on their information from their surroundings.
Second, to take into account the geographical or social segregation phenomena,
as analyzed by Schelling[10], we also study how clusters and their size may aﬀect
the operation eﬃciency of the political future markets. Using this Schelling-lik
model, we can study the eﬀect of cluster size to the prediction accuracy of the
political future markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our spatial
agent-based model of prediction markets, built on the very simple behavioral
assumption of agents, namely, the zero-intelligent agents. Section 3 presents the
agent-based simulation results. Section 3.1 shows that, by very simple behav-
ioral assumptions of the traders, our agent-based model can replicate the well-
known favorite-longshot bias. Section 3.2 further shows the prediction accuracy
in monotonically (linearly) increasing in terms of the neighborhood size. Section
3.3 studies the eﬀect of the geographical distribution of information on predic-
tion accuracy. We ﬁnd that, given the neighborhood size, there is a non-linear
relation between block size and prediction error. Section 3.4 searches for the
possible origins of the favorite-longshot bias, and indicates how the bid and askAgent-Based Modeling of the Prediction Markets for Political Election 3
Fig.1. Illustration of voter’s political preference in a two-dimensional grid.
behavior can attribute to the emergence of this bias. Concluding remarks are
g i v e ni nS e c t i o n4 .
2B a s i c M o d e l
In a society represented by a two-dimensional torus grid, each element is a per-
son, and each person has his own disposition on the vote for some candidate,
blue for supporting (1) and green for not supporting (0) as in Figure 1. Figure
1 is simply for the illustrative purpose. In our simulation, we consider a more
extensive model with a grid size of 200 × 200. Furthermore, in the simulations,
the agents’ voting disposition is randomly initialized with a given overall support
ratio. This parameter is denoted as SupportRatio.
Some agents randomly sampled from the entire population will participate
in a prediction market which provides a winner-take-all contract that pays a
dollar if the candidate wins, and pays nothing if the candidate loses.1 Each
agent has a belief (subjective probability) bi ∈ [0,1] that a candidate will win.
This subjective belief is formed based on the sample statistics (sample mean)
of the voting disposition of agent’s neighbors. His/her neighbors consist of the
center node (the agent himself) and the nearest Moore neighbors. Hence, the
neighborhood has 9 agents for neighborhood radius r = 1, and 25 agents for
neighborhood radius r = 2, as in Figure 2. For the agent marked with the red
star, his own vote disposition is to support the candidate, and there are two other
agents in his neighborhood with radius r = 1 who also support the candidate
(Figure 2, left panel), so his belief is bi =3 /9=1 /3. If the radius r =2( F i g u r e
2, right panel), his belief is bi =5 /25 = 1/5.
This belief (subjective probability) will be taken as the reference price in
the following sense that the agent would like to sell the future with any price
1 The winner-take-all market and the share market are the two commonly used designs
for the prediction markets. For the latter, the market participant is paid, according
to the election results, by the ﬁnal voting share of the candidate. Our agent-based
model introduced here is equally applicable to the share market.4 Tongkui Yu, Shu-Heng Chen
(a) r=1
(b) r=2
Fig.2. Moore neighborhood of the agent in a two-dimensional grid
higher than this one, and would like buy with any price lower than this one.
More speciﬁcally, by using the device of the zero-intelligence agent, the agent
with belief bi places a bid order for one share of the event at a price uniformly
on [0,b i], or an ask order for one share at a price uniformly on [bi,1], as in
ﬁgure 3. The role of the agent, a buyer (to bid) or a seller (to ask), is randomly
determined with equal probability. In vein of the zero-intelligence design, the
learning or strategic behavior of agents is not taken into account. Agents do not
“observe” (care) current market prices, and do not react to the result of their
previous actions; they keep no record of previous unﬁnished orders.
This is a device of the zero-intelligence agent initiated by Gode and Sunder
[8], which is now widely used in the agent-based models. The zero-intelligence
agent is a randomly-behaving agent or, more precisely speaking, an entropy-
maximizing agent. Since normal traders would not propose or accept a deal
which would obviously lead to economic loss or not lead to welfare improve-
ment, under no further information on what else they will do, the design of the
zero-intelligence agent is minimally prejudiced in the sense of entropy maximiza-
tion. The uniform distribution is employed here to realize the maximum entropy.






























Fig.3. Order price formationAgent-Based Modeling of the Prediction Markets for Political Election 5
Following [9], the transactions are closed by the mechanism of continuous
double exchange. Agents place buy or sell orders continuously. Once the highest-
priced bid exceeds the lowest-priced ask, a trade occurs at the price of the or-
der which was placed ﬁrst. The paper, however, diﬀers from [9] by explicitly
embedding the agent-based prediction market within the network structure, a
checkerboard as demonstrated in Figure 1. We consider this as a ﬁrst attempt to
hybridize the spatial agent-based political election models and the agent-based
prediction markets for political elections.
The procedure of the model is described by the pseudocode in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Simulation Procedure
Require: Total number of agents N; Rounds of the market M;T h eo v e r a l l
support ratio SupportRatio;
Ensure: Transaction price history TransactionPrice
// INITIALIZATION
Generate a random number rndNum uniformly from 0 to 1
for each agent in the population do
if rndNum < SupportRatio then
Set his voting disposition as supporting (1)
else
Set his voting disposition as not supporting (0)
end if
end for
// RUNNING THE MARKET
for round ∈ [1,M] do
Choose an agent randomly from the whole population
Get the voting dispositions of his neighbors
Set the agent’s belief b as the number of supporters over neighborhood
size
Generate a random number rndNum uniformly from 0 to 1
if rndNum < 0.5 then
Set the order side to 1 (buy)
Set the OrderPrice as a random number uniformly drawn from 0 to b
Get the MinSellPrice in the SellOrderList
if OrderPrice > MinSellPrice then
Insert a transaction in the TransactionList with MinSellPrice
else
Insert a buy order with OrderPrice in the BuyOrderList
end if
else
Set the order side to 0 (sell)
Set the OrderPrice as a random number uniformly drawn from b to 1
Get the MaxBuyPrice in the BuyOrderList
if OrderPrice < MaxBuyPrice then
Insert a transaction in the TransactionList with MaxBuyPrice
else6 Tongkui Yu, Shu-Heng Chen






























Fig.4. Typical simulation result and favorite-longshot bias.





3 Simulation and Analysis
We perform a great deal of simulations and try to ﬁnd the regularity in the
simulated data.
3.1 Prediction power and favorite-longshot bias
In the agent-based model of the political election prediction market, the mean
of the transaction price is normally taken as a good predictor of the real support
ratio in the overall population. Figure 4 provides the relationship between the
real support ratio (vertical axis) and the mean of the transactionprice (horizontal
axis) in typical simulations with the neighborhood radius r = 1. This simulation
is conducted in a 200 by 200 checkerboard with 40,000 agents (N =4 0 ,000),
one in each cell (a checkerboard with full size). For each given support ratio, the
continuous double auction is run once for 40,000 rounds. We then try support
ratios from 0.1 to 0.9 with an increment of 0.01; in other words, a total of 81
support ratios are tried. We then plot the mean of the transaction price over the
40,000 rounds for each support ratio in Figure 4. As we can see from that ﬁgure,
the mean transaction price can trace the true support ratio to some degree.
At the same time, the simulation replicates the favorite-longshot bias, a styl-
ized fact in the prediction market. We can ﬁnd that unlikely events (bottom-leftAgent-Based Modeling of the Prediction Markets for Political Election 7
































Fig.5. Neighborhood radius and prediction accuracy.
in Figure 4) are overpriced, and likely events (top-right in Figure 4) are under-
priced.
3.2 Neighborhood scope and prediction accuracy
We investigate the eﬀect of the neighborhood scope on the prediction accuracy.
Figure 5 provides the relationship between the real support ratio (vertical axis)
and the mean of the transaction price (horizontal axis) in typical simulations
with diﬀerent neighborhood radii r =1 ,2 and 3. We can ﬁnd that the prediction
accuracy of the prediction market increases as the neighborhood scope increases.
It is easy to understand that the more information that each participant has,
the more accurate the prediction that the market can provide. This result is
similar to the work of Othman [9]. However, we obtain the result with a totally
diﬀerent basic assumption. We use rather simple assumption that the agent forms
his belief by observing his neighbors’ voting deposition, while Othman’s work
requires speciﬁc distribution of belief. With this distinction, we attribute the
extent of the bias to the amount of individual information that each individual
agent has, while Othman’s work attributes it to the arbitrarily speciﬁed belief
distribution.
To measure the prediction accuracy of a prediction market, we deﬁne a vari-






where i =1:S is the number of simulations. A larger mean squared error implies
less accurate prediction, while a smaller one implies more accurate prediction,
and ρ = 0 implies perfect accuracy. With the same neighborhood radius, we
simulate S(S = 200) times with SupportRatio linearly spaced between 0 and 1
and calculate the prediction accuracy. Figure 6 presents the eﬀect of the neigh-
borhood radius r (horizontal) on the prediction accuracy (vertical axis). The8 Tongkui Yu, Shu-Heng Chen































Fig.6. Eﬀect of neighborhood radius on the prediction accuracy.
larger the neighborhood radius r, the more information agents have, and the
more accurate prediction the market can provide.
3.3 Information distribution and prediction accuracy
In a real political election, the voting deposition may be clustered. Some places
may be dominated by the supporter of one candidate, and most of the popula-
tion may support the other candidate elsewhere. So the information is not well
scattered. We wish to study the eﬀect of information distribution on the predic-
tion accuracy. To this end, we manipulate the block size of voting disposition to
represent diﬀerent information distributions.
When initializing the voting disposition of the agents, we use diﬀerent gran-
ularities or block size s. If the block size s = 1, we initialize the agents’ voting
disposition one by one; if the block size s=2, we initialize the agents’ voting
disposition two by two, i.e., all four agents in the 2 × 2 sub-grid have the same
voting disposition randomly generated according to the speciﬁed support ratio.
Figure 7 illustrates a comparison of information distributions with block sizes
s = 1 and 2 under the same support ratio 0.3.
Figure 8 depicts the eﬀect of voting disposition block size on prediction ac-
curacy with neighborhood radii r =2 ,3,5 and 7. We can ﬁnd the nonlinear rela-
tionship between the block size and mean squared error. The mean squared error
is the largest when the voting disposition block size is close to the neighborhood
radius, and the market prediction power is the least accurate. The farther away
the voting disposition block size is from the neighborhood radius, the smaller is
the mean squared error, the more accurate is the market prediction. This result
is conﬁrmed by ﬁgure 9 which provides the combination eﬀect of block size and
neighborhood radius to the mean squared error. Further research is needed to
understand this phenomenon.Agent-Based Modeling of the Prediction Markets for Political Election 9
(a) s =1 (b) s =2
Fig.7. Comparison of information distributions with diﬀerent block sizes of voting
disposition
3.4 The origin of the favorite-longshot bias
So far, we have shown that we can replicate the favorite-longshot bias. The ad-
vantage of using agent-based models is that we can go further to ask whether we
can trace the possible source of this bias. To ﬁnd the mechanism that produces
the favorite-longshot bias, we have performed some experiments. One possible
origin of the favorite-longshot bias is the price formation mechanism; the base-
line version closes transactions at the price of the order (bid or ask) which was
ﬁrst placed. An alternative price formation mechanism is to take average of the
bid and ask, instead of only one of the two (the earlier posted one). Nonethe-
less, our simulation shows that the favorite-longshot bias still exists with this
modiﬁcation.
The other possible origin of the favorite-longshot bias is the order-formation
mechanism. The baseline version is that an agent can submit a bid between zero
and his belief bi or an ask at a price between bi and 1 (as in Figure 3). When the
agents’ belief is not equal to 0.5, there is an inherent asymmetry between the
range of bid and the range of ask. This may lead to the favorite-longshot bias.
We test the hypothesis by proposing a symmetric order price formation mech-
anism where an agent submit a bid at a price drawn randomly from [bi−δ,bi], or
submit an ask at a price drawn randomly from [bi,b i+δ] as in Figure 10(a) . We
ﬁnd that the favorite-longshot bias disappears in this speciﬁcation as in 10(b).
Moreover, we perform a simulation using the designed asymmetric order price
formation mechanism, where the prices of buy orders are uniformly on [bi−δ,bi]
and the prices of sell orders are uniformly on [bi,b i +2δ] as in Figure 10(c), and
we ﬁnd that the prices are all overvalued as in ﬁgure 10(d). Furthermore, if the
prices of buy orders are uniformly on [bi − 2δ,bi] and the prices of sell orders
are uniformly on [bi,b i + δ] as in Figure 10(e), the prices are all undervalued as10 Tongkui Yu, Shu-Heng Chen







































































































































Fig.8. The eﬀect of voting disposition block size on prediction accuracy
in Figure 10(f). So we can come to the conclusion that the asymmetry of the
order-price mechanism is the one of possible origins of the favorite-longshot bias.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Prediction markets and experimental markets are, so far, the two real tests for
the Hayek hypothesis on the market mechanism as functions of information ag-
gregation and information externality. Given the competitiveness and the popu-
larity of the ideas of prediction markets, it would be imperative to see how this
idea actually works, and agent-based modeling can provide possible rich settings
to examine their functions. In this speciﬁc paper, we show how the well-known
favorite-longshot bias can be replicated through one version of our agent-based
model; but we also show how diﬀerent settings may cause this bias to disap-
pear. Neighborhood size and cluster size all have their eﬀects on the accuracy of
the prediction markets, but the cross interaction of the two needs to be further
examined.
One extension of this paper is to replace the zero-intelligence agents with










































Fig.9. Block Size, neighborhood radius and prediction accuracy.
shed light on. As what has been analyzed in this paper, the favorite-longshot
bias can be caused by the asymmetric trading behavior of the agent, and the
bias disappears when symmetric trading behavior is imposed. However, regard-
less of being symmetric or asymmetric, the zero-intelligence trading behavior
characterized by the uniform-distributional bids or asks is not realistic, at least
for economists.2 Therefore, one could argue that the favorite-longshot bias can
equally likely be caused by more deliberate and sophisticate trading behavior. If
so, what would be the minimal description of the “smart” behavior leading to
this bias is a question for the future of the research. Finally, whether the sim-
ulation results can have important implications for the design of the prediction
market is also an issue for further study [11].
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